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RESPONSE TO THE COST OF GUILTY 
BREACH: WHAT WORK IS “WILLFUL 
BREACH” DOING? 
BRIAN JM QUINN* 
In this Response, Professor Brian Quinn comments on The Cost of Guilty Breach: 
Willful Breach in M&A Contracts.1 That Essay can be found here. 
RESPONSE 
The authors of The Cost of Guilty Breach have pointed out an interesting 
issue—why is it that merger agreements import into their contracts language of 
moral culpability to establish liability in connection with a breach of the 
agreement? The authors propose some persuasive hypotheses to explain the 
presence of “willful breach” language. In this brief response, I mostly agree 
with the authors and offer a few of my own thoughts about the merger contract 
and breach. 
As the authors note, merger agreements typically include “termination 
fees.” Although the courts will examine termination fees using the language of 
liquidated damages, strictly speaking they are not liquidated damages payable 
upon a breach of the contract.2 Termination fees are best understood as negoti-
ated fees payable when the contract is terminated pursuant to its terms, rather 
than in the context of a breach. Where parties are in actual breach, termination 
provisions do not come into play at all. Indeed, merger agreements typically 
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 1 Theresa Arnold, Amanda Dixon, Madison Whalen Sherrill, Hadar Tanne & Mitu Gulati, The 
Cost of Guilty Breach: Willful Breach in M&A Contracts, 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-32 (2021), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol62/iss9/23/ [https://perma.cc/Y9Q4-XJEW]. 
 2 Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. 1997) (describing the two-part test to determine 
the validity of termination fee provisions: first, that damages that would result from a breach of the 
merger agreement must be uncertain or incapable of accurate calculation, and second, that the size of 
the fee is not unreasonably large as to constitute a penalty (quoting Lee Builders, Inc. v. Wells, 103 
A.2d 918, 919 (Del. Ch. 1954)). Although Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp. purportedly applied the 
standard test for liquidation provisions, it did so with a decidedly corporate law skew, relying heavily 
on the language of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. to determine whether the size of the fee was 
“within a range of reasonableness.” Id. at 48–49; see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment 
rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”). Subsequently, courts have explicitly ap-
plied Unocal’s intermediate standard to its evaluation of termination fees as deal protection measures 
in merger agreements. See, e.g., In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 997, 1000 
(Del. Ch. 2005). 
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attempt to limit remedies to specific performance, rather than expectation 
damages or any other form of damages.3 Because termination fees do not in-
volve actual breach, the circumstances in which such fees are payable are rela-
tively limited and entirely foreseeable by the parties. 
Termination fees come in one of two basic types: fiduciary termination 
fees, paid to the buyer by the seller, and reverse termination fees, paid to the 
seller by the buyer. Fiduciary termination fees are payable to the buyer by the 
seller in the event a seller’s fiduciary duties require its board to terminate the 
incumbent transaction to enter into an alternative transaction that is materially 
better for the shareholders than the incumbent merger. Because directors are 
generally prohibited from entering into merger agreements that do not include 
fiduciary termination rights, such rights are commonplace in merger agree-
ments, as are attendant termination fees.4 
Although termination fees are common, they do not attempt to mimic ex-
pectation damages. Indeed, judicial constraints on their amount make it impos-
sible for transaction planners to gauge the size of termination fees to an actual 
estimate of the buyer’s damages in the event the seller terminates the transac-
tion to pursue a superior alternative. This is because a large fiduciary termina-
tion fee can act to deter subsequent bids—to be successful, a subsequent bid-
der’s valuation of the target must exceed the deal price plus the value of any 
fiduciary termination fee payable by the seller upon a termination. The larger 
the termination fee, the less likely a subsequent bidder will be able to outbid 
the incumbent purchaser. Where a termination provision is so large as to deter 
subsequent bids, however, a board may violate its fiduciary duties by agreeing 
to it.5 Consequently, termination fees are usually capped at approximately three 
percent of deal value, which likely bears no relation to expectation damages, 
but does represent a judicially determined amount that is not so large as to de-
ter a subsequent bid. 
The second type of termination fee common in merger agreements is the 
reverse termination fee. The reverse termination fee is paid by the buyer to the 
seller in the event the merger cannot be completed due to one of a small num-
ber of possible reasons, including failure to gain regulatory approval (antitrust, 
for example) or financing.6 Obviously, in the event regulatory approval is not 
forthcoming, specific performance is not going to be available as a remedy. 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Theresa Arnold, Amanda Gray Dixon, Hadar Tanne, Madison Whalen Sherrill & Mitu Gulati, 
Lipstick on a Pig: Specific Performance Clauses in Action, 2021 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (analyz-
ing the use of specific performance remedies in merger agreements). 
 4 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d. 914, 938 (Del. 2003) (holding that when 
boards enter into merger agreements that do not permit them to consider superior alternatives, they 
violate their fiduciary duties). 
 5 See Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1014–22 (discussing how excessive termination fees may pre-
clude higher bids). 
 6 Brian JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 813 (2010). 
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The reverse termination fee is an attempt to compensate the seller for the sell-
er’s damages if it is left at the veritable merger altar. Often, for symmetry and 
ease of negotiation, these fees are set at the same size as the seller’s termina-
tion fee. With the seller’s fee judicially constrained, however, using symmetry 
to set the reverse termination fee is never going to reflect an adequate estimate 
of actual damages. Because the reverse fee is not judicially constrained in the 
same way the termination fee is, it can be, and often is, larger than the typical 
termination fee.7 Sometimes, parties set larger reverse termination fees as part 
of a legitimate effort to estimate reasonable damages to the seller in the event 
they are jilted by the buyer due to a regulatory hurdle. In other circumstances, 
buyers use outsized reverse termination provisions to signal to antitrust author-
ities their determination to get the deal done (Google and Motorola Mobility, 
for example).8 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, some private equity buyers triggered re-
verse termination fees due to their inability to arrange financing for the trans-
action. Where contracts limited remedies in the event of financing failure to 
the reverse termination fee, this effectively turned the merger agreement into a 
call option for the buyer.9 Today, the use of reverse termination fees in this 
manner is much less common. Like reverse termination fees in the context of 
government approvals, those tied to financing conditions work to compensate 
jilted sellers in the event financing is not forthcoming, as well as to incentivize 
buyers to expend efforts to meet the financing condition. I will limit the bal-
ance of my comments on reverse termination fees to just reverse termination 
fees involving regulatory approvals. 
The authors of The Cost of Guilty Breach point to what is likely the moti-
vation for the willful breach language in termination provisions. More likely 
than not, the willful breach language represents an attempt to smoke out pre-
textual rationales for buyers not completing an acquisition. Remember, failure 
to meet, for example, the regulatory condition is not a breach of contract in and 
of itself. Rather, failure to achieve regulatory approval leads to a negotiated 
right to terminate the contract, pursuant to its terms. Why? Because failure to 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. at 809. 
 8 In 2012, Google agreed to pay Motorola Mobility a reverse termination fee equal to $2.5 billion (approx-
imately twenty percent of deal value) in the event antitrust authorities did not approve the transaction. The large 
size of this fee signals to antitrust authorities that the buyer is determined to push a deal through and will be 
willing to fight the government to avoid becoming liable for a large reverse termination fee payment. See Shira 
Ovide, Google-Motorola Merger Agreement: The Highlights, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2011), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/BL-DLB-34387 [https://perma.cc/VK5M-MAY7]. 
 9 Quinn, supra note 6, at 813; see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Private Equity Contract, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRIVATE EQUITY 15, 16 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012). In Hexion Spe-
cialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., the buyer attempted to walk away from the seller in part 
because the buyer was unable to arrange financing for the purchase due to fragility of global credit 
markets. 965 A.2d 715, 721 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
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obtain regulatory approval is a semi-exogenous variable in the deal making 
process. To the extent approval or denial of regulatory approval stems from 
national policy, whether such approval is forthcoming is outside the control of 
either buyer or seller. In that sense, it is an exogenous contractual condition, 
failure of which does not necessarily suggest any level of fault by either party. 
The authors of The Cost of Guilty Breach recognize this and suggest failure of 
a regulatory approval condition might be innocent. 
On the other hand, whether regulatory approval is forthcoming is also a 
function of the level of effort the parties decide to exert in the process of seek-
ing approval. A reluctant buyer might decide to negotiate less aggressively 
with regulatory authorities, or might foot-drag with respect to filing require-
ments and thus impede the approval process. To the extent regulatory approv-
als are dependent on the efforts of the buyer to the transaction, this condition is 
endogenous. The authors characterize—and rightly so—failure to obtain gov-
ernment approval due to insufficient efforts on the part of the buyer as a guilty 
breach. 
And it is here where we begin to understand the role of willful breach in 
the merger contract. Willful breach, in this context, is not a moral judgment on 
the buyer’s behavior, but rather an attempt to smoke out buyer pretext. 
Remember, because reverse termination fees are often symmetrical with 
termination fees in size, they often do not even vaguely attempt to compensate 
buyers for actual harm caused by a failure to gain regulatory approval. If a re-
morseful buyer decided that rather than complete the acquisition it need only 
foot-drag on regulatory approval and then pay the reverse termination fee to 
terminate the contract pursuant to its terms, then the reverse termination fee 
would convert the merger contract into an option contract. 
The presence of willful breach gives sellers another lever to police buyer 
efforts. Where the regulatory approval process fails, before a buyer may termi-
nate the transaction pursuant to its terms, the seller is permitted to test the buy-
er’s motivation. Take, for example, the recent acquisition of Tiffany by 
LVMH.10 The deal was announced in November 2019, but following the onset 
of COVID-19, LVMH began to get cold feet.11 As is common, various regula-
tory approvals were conditions of the transaction and both buyer and seller 
committed to expend their “reasonable best efforts” to secure these approv-
als.12 Although the transaction did not include a reverse termination fee (they 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Tiffany & Co., LVMH Möet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton 
SE & Breakfast Acquisition Corp. (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98246/
000119312519299997/d840067dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/TF2X-YFSQ]. 
 11 Carol Ryan, LVMH Has Reasons to Get Cold Feet over Tiffany, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lvmh-has-reasons-to-get-cold-feet-over-tiffany-11591189844 [https://
perma.cc/7QLD-YJLQ]. 
 12 Plan of Merger, supra note 10, § 7.3(b). 
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are less common in strategic acquisitions), it did include the willful breach 
language.13 In the event the parties reached the outside date for the transaction 
and government approval was not forthcoming, LVMH would be permitted to 
terminate the transaction pursuant to its terms and walk away without paying a 
fee. How then to interpret a mysterious letter from French government agency 
that described the French government’s desire that LVMH delay closing the 
merger until after the transaction’s drop-dead date as anything other than a pre-
text intended to permit LVMH to walk away without breaching the contract?14 
Willful breach gives the seller a contractual tool to police pretexts where 
buyers, like LVMH, engage in foot-dragging to avoid closing. If the seller is 
able to establish willful breach, then the seller can rely on the contract’s reme-
dies clause to seek specific performance to move the buyer to close, notwith-
standing the buyer’s cold feet.15 In the absence of willful breach language, a 
buyer’s cold feet would allow the buyer to point to pretexts and transform the 
merger agreement into little more than an option contract that permits the buy-
er to pay a fee and walk away when the buyer develops remorse post-signing 
(or in the case of LVMH, pay nothing). 
Though willful breach may suggest moral judgment, its use in merger 
agreements merely cabins the ability of buyers to terminate the agreement pur-
suant to its terms and reins in the ability of buyers to look to pretextual excuses 
to avoid performance. 
The Cost of Guilty Breach’s close read of merger contracting practices is 
an excellent addition to the series of papers this group of authors has written 
on contract theory and the merger contract. Hopefully, they are not done yet. 
Preferred citation: Brian JM Quinn, Response to The Cost of Guilty Breach: What Work Is “Willful 
Breach” Doing?, 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-49 (2021), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol62/iss9/27/. 
13 Id. §§ 1.1, 9.5(c). The merger agreement included the following definition: 
“Willful Breach” means, with respect to any representation, warranty, agreement or 
covenant, an action or omission taken or omitted to be taken that the breaching party in-
tentionally takes (or intentionally fails to take) and knows (or reasonably should have 
known) would, or would reasonably be expected to, cause a material breach of such 
representation, warranty, agreement or covenant (regardless of whether breaching was 
the object of the act or omission). 
Id. § 1.1. “Willful Breach” is then used in the termination provision. Id. § 9.5(c). 
 14 Flavia Krause-Jackson, LVMH’s Arnault Leaned on Government to Exit Tiffany Deal, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-09/lvmh-s-arnault-leaned-on-
french-government-to-exit-tiffany-deal [https://perma.cc/PH28-DB7L]; see also French Government 
Request That LVMH Delay Tiffany Deal Was Only Advice—Source, FIN. POST (Sept. 9, 2020), https://
financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/french-government-request-that-lvmh-delay-tiffany-deal-was-
only-advice-source-2 [https://perma.cc/XTT8-8S2L]. 
15 See, e.g., In re IBP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 83–84 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
